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Abstract 
This paper considers the public and private sector wage earners in Egypt and examines their wage 
distribution during 1998-2012 using Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey. We estimate the public-
private sector wage gap with Mincer wage equations both at the mean and at different quantiles of the 
wage distribution. In this process we take into account observable and unobservable characteristics of 
the individuals using the panel feature of the data with a fixed effects model. We address sector of 
employment selection issue for both males and females.  We find that there is very little evidence of 
sample selection in our data. Therefore, we present both the selection corrected results and the results 
with no selection correction. We find a persistent public sector wage penalty for males and public sector 
wage premium for females in the face of extensive sensitivity checks. They are larger when unobserved 
heterogeneity is taken into account for males but insignificant for females. They are similar across the 
quantiles for males but, smaller at the top than at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution for 
females. We further examine the public sector wage gap over time and in different sub-groups according 
to age and education. The public sector wage penalty for males has decreased recently over time and is 
larger for the better educated and younger. We also find substantial regional differences in public sector 
wage gap for males.  
JEL: C21, C23, J16, J31, J45 
Keywords: Public Sector, Private Sector, Wage Gap, Gender, Sample Selection, Quantile 
Regression, Panel Data, Egypt 
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1) Introduction   
 
For many years it was government policy in Egypt to provide employment for graduates 
in the public sector. There are many studies on the causes and consequences of this policy.  This 
policy was abandoned in the early 1990s. Further, the public sector employment is being 
retrenched in Egypt since the early 1990s due to extensive privatizations. The competitive labor 
market paradigm does not relate to the public sector employment. The working conditions, 
retirement provisions and other benefits are thought to be better in the public sector than in the 
private sector. For this reason, public versus private sector wage gap is of utmost importance to 
the policy makers.  Further, public sector pay is believed to influence the private sector pay. 
Institutional characteristics may influence the public and private sector pay gap. They may 
include the minimum wage, wage indexation, employment protection legislation and strength 
of unionization. Such institutional factors may not be relevant for the Egyptian labor market. 
However, the level of centralization of the public sector is strong in Egypt. 
 
Recently, Assaad (1997) and Said (2015) have investigated the earnings in the public 
sector in Egypt. However, this is the first study that explicitly investigates the public versus 
private earnings differential in Egypt using panel data which is rare in developing countries. 
We examine the cases of females and males separately during the 1998-2012 period using the 
Egyptian Labor Market Panel Survey. We estimate Mincer wage equations both at the mean 
and at different quantiles of the wage distribution taking into account observable and 
unobservable characteristics with a fixed effects model. We first provide an application of 
quantile regression of the wage equations with sample selection correction. Upon finding that 
there is very little evidence of sample selection in our data we then turn to further estimates 
without sector selection correction. We find a persistent public sector wage penalty for males 
and public sector wage premium for females. They are larger when unobserved heterogeneity 
is taken into account for males but insignificant for females. They are similar across the 
quantiles for males but, smaller at the top than at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution 
for females.  In addition, we also examine the public versus private sector earnings differential 
over time  as well as for the different sub-groups of the population according to age, education 
and region of residence. The public sector wage penalty for males has decreased recently over 
time and is larger for the better educated and younger. There are also significant regional 
differences.  
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of literature.  A brief 
background on Egyptian labor market is provided is Section 3. Section 4 explains the data used 
and the descriptive evidence. The methodology and the empirical strategy followed are 
described in Section 5.  Estimation results with sample selection correction are discussed in 
Section 6. Section 7 presents the estimation results without the sample selection correction. 
Concluding remarks appear in Section 8. 
 
2) Brief Review of Literature 
 
Gregory and Borland (1999) provide a thorough review of literature on public sector 
labor markets. The vast majority of the public-earnings gap literature concentrates on cross-
sectional differences in wages. Most studies also address the non-random sector selection. Such 
studies include Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) and van Ophem (1993) for the Netherlands, 
Lassibille (1998) for Spain, Dustmann and van Soest (1998) and Melly (2005) for Germany, 
Disney and Gosling (2003) for the UK, Tansel (2005) for Turkey and Bargain and Melly (2008) 
for France. Lucifora and Meurs (2006) measure and decompose public-private earnings 
differences in the UK, France and Italy. For France and Italy they conclude that in the private 
sector the use of collective bargaining and union power are substantial. This results in a pay 
setting system based heavily on rewarding observable characteristics such as education and 
experience.  This can explain the substantial part of public sector earnings gap. Their results of 
quantile regression analysis is similar to Melly's findings for Germany. They find that as one 
moves up the earnings distribution, the proportion of the pay gap explained by observable 
factors  increases. In contrast, in the lower quantiles differences in unobserved characteristics 
are more important in explaining pay differences. Similar results for France and Italy are also 
found by Ghinetti and Lucifora (2007) using European Community Household Panel data from 
the 2001 wave. Van Ophem (1993) uses functional form assumptions to deal with the sector 
selection issue. Dustmann and van Soest (1998) and Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) use an 
instrumental variables approach. Further they consider only cross-sectional differences in 
instantaneous earnings between the public and private sectors.  
 
Cappellari (2002) and Postel-Vinay and Turon (2007) are the only studies that address 
differences in earnings dynamics between the public and private sectors.  Capellari uses a panel 
of Italian administrative data and assumes exogenous selection of individuals into sectors. He 
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also contributes on empirical models of income dynamics and study of lifetime income 
inequality. Heitmueller and Mavromaras (2007) study the public–private sector pay gap in 
Germany in the 1990s. They find that throughout the 1990s the pay gap remained stable in the 
West and increased considerably in the East which is an indication of the public sector crowding 
out the private sector in the East. 
 
 Dell’Aringa, et al. (2007) investigate regional public–private wage gap in Italy using 
geographically weighted regressions. They find that the pay gap can be partly explained by 
local labor market conditions affecting the private sector and only marginally the public sector. 
The regional pay gaps are found to explain regional imbalances in terms of ‘wait’ 
unemployment and regional recruitment problems. Garcia-Perez and Jimeno (2007) also 
investigate wage differences among regions using data from the European Community 
Household Panel for the period 1995–2001. They find that the public sector wage gaps vary 
across gender, educational levels and occupations. 
 
Cai and Liu (2011) examine the public-private wage gap along the wage distribution 
employing quantile regressions. The pay gaps decrease monotonically and are negative at the 
top half of the distribution for males while pay premiums are relatively stable across the 
distribution for females. Giordano et al. (2011) use the 2004-2007 SILC data for 10 European 
Union countries. They find a public sector premium in most countries. Campos and Centeno 
(2012) analyze the evolution of public wages and the public-private wage gaps in several 
European countries using fixed effects quantile regressions. They find that the public-private 
pay gap increased in the 1990’s favoring the public sector employees compared to private sector 
employees with the same observable and unobservable characteristics.  Siminski (2013) 
investigates the public–private wage gap for Australia across the wage distribution with 
significant premium for women but not for men. He finds that the compressed wage profile of 
the public sector induces the best workers (on unobserved skills) to join the public sector in 
both high and low wage occupations. Christofides and Michael (2013) estimate the public 
versus private pay gap for 27 European countries using the 2008 SILC data. They account for 
selectivity and decompose into explained and unexplained components. The QR estimates show 
that public-private wage gap is generally larger at the bottom than at the top of the wage 
distribution.  
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Nikolic (2014) investigates the public–private pay gap in Serbia with significant 
changes over the 1995-2008 period. He finds negative pay gaps at early stages of economic 
transition but positive ones during large-scale privatizations. Lausev (2014) surveys the 
literature on public–private pay gap in transitioning countries of Eastern Europe and compares 
the results with those from developed countries. He finds public sector pay penalties during the 
period of economic transition from a communist to market-based economy as compared to zero 
or positive pay gap in developed economies.  He also concludes that the competition for workers 
is the major cause of the systematic pay differences between the two sectors. 
 
Christopoulou and Monastiriotis (2014) study the public–private pay gap in Greece. 
They find a large public premium which is mostly accounted for by self-selection into the sector 
that rewards better their characteristics for men, while it is due to public-private differences in 
returns for women.  Depalo et al. (2015) consider the euro-area and provide quantile 
decompositions. Hospido and Moral-Benito (2016) examine the Spanish pay gap utilizing data 
from tax records. They find a public sector premium which also varies along the wage 
distribution after accounting for characteristics and endogenous selection. Mahuteau et al. 
(2017) examine the case in Australia using a panel data quantile regression with fixed effects 
controlling for observable and un-observable factors. They find a public sector premium which 
is slightly higher for females than for males. This impact is larger at the lower end of the wage 
distribution than at other parts. 
 
3) Egyptian Public and Private Labor Markets 
 
Tansel and Ozdemir (2014) and Tansel et al. (2015) provide a recent review of the 
Egyptian economy and the labor market. This section will give a brief overview of the Egyptian 
public and private labor market. According to the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) 
2012, the government employment is about 24 percent among men and 12 percent among 
women. According to recent statistics public sector employs 27 percent of all workers and 44 
percent of the wage earners (Amin, 2014).   Women out of the labor force are substantial. About 
10 percent of men and 72 percent of women are out of labor force (Tansel and Ozdemir, 2014).  
During the past two decades substantial labor retrenchment took place in the public sector. 
Therefore, the government employment opportunities have been declining recently.  Public 
administration lost about 40,000 jobs during the 2006-2012 (World Bank, 2014).  However, 
government employment is a more attractive employment option in particular for women than 
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private sector jobs. Individual self-employment and employment in household enterprises 
constituted more than a third of overall employment in 2006. Nearly half of private sector wage 
employment was in micro enterprises of fewer than five workers (Said, 2009). Therefore, 
informal employment is rather large with strong segmentation as noted by Gatti et al. (2014).  
Tansel et al. (2015) find large informal sector penalty in earnings vis-à-vis the formal sector in 
Egypt. 
 
Female labor force participation is very low in Egypt. It was 23.1 percent for females 
and 80.2 percent for males in 2012 (Assaad and Krafft, 2013).  The 15-29 year olds constitute 
about a quarter of the total labor force. Unemployment rate was about 12.6 percent in 2016 and 
higher for females than for males (CAPMAS, 2014).  Almost over 75 percent of the 
unemployed was 15-29 years old implying an unemployment problem for the youth. The 
unemployment rate is also rather high among the highly educated (Assaad and Krafft, 2013). 
Thus, although their labor force participations are very low, women and the young exhibit high 
unemployment rates. Labor legislation mainly effects small number of wage and salary workers 
in the private formal sector, civil servants and public sector. Labor law in Egypt might be 
considered rigid de jure, by international standards but, they are not enforced de facto (Angel-
Urdinola and Kuddo, 2011). Thus enforcement remains weak (Lohmann, 2010). The trade 
union membership is weak (Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo, 2011). The trade union density rate in 
2007 as a proportion of total employment was 16.1 and as a proportion of wage and salary 
earners was 26.1. Collective bargaining coverage in the private sector is limited. The minimum 
wage law is effective only in the public sector.  It was adjusted twice recently; in 2012 for the 
first time since the 1980’s  and then in 2014. 
 
Recently, there was a trend toward greater formalization in private wage employment 
(Said, 2009).    However informal employment has increased recently due to the privatization 
along with a decline in public sector employment opportunities and the introduction of the 2003 
Labor Law. The 2003 Labor Law brought more flexibility in employment relations which is 
believed to cause an increase in informal employment yet at the same time contributed to 
formalization since then (Wahba and Assaad, 2015).  However, World Bank (2014) notes a 
recent increase in informality across nearly every industry and at all education categories for 
men. 
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 Assaad (2009) and Said (2009) express concern about recent high unemployment rate 
among the university graduates. Their another concern is the recent declining participation rates 
of educated females who drop out of the labor force when discouraged due to lack of 
government employment opportunities  
 
4) The Data and the Descriptive Evidence 
 
This study is based on the longitudinal survey of Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey 
(ELMPS) carried out in 1998, 2006 and 2012. The surveys are publicly available in the 
Economic Research Forum (ERF) web page free of charge. The surveys were implemented by 
the ERF in cooperation with Egypt’s Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics 
(CAPMAS).  These nationally representative surveys cover a wide-range of topics including 
individual, demographic and labor market characteristics, parental background, time use and 
fertility among others. The 1998 round includes a sample of 4,816 households and 23,997 
individuals. The 2006 round, located 3,685 households from the 1998 round. A refresher sample 
of 2,498 households were added giving a total of 37,140 individuals in the 2006 round. The 
2012 round interviewed households from the 2006 and 1998 rounds. A refresher sample of 
2,000 households were added giving a total of 49,186 individuals in the 2012 round. Attrition 
both at the household and individual levels are discussed by Assaad and Krafft (2013) 
extensively. They note that the attrition was mostly random from 1998 to 2006 but “complex 
in nature” from 2006 to 2012. They correct for the attrition using nonresponse weighs which 
are computed with observable characteristics of individuals and households. These weights are 
used to adjust for the attrition in the descriptive statistics in Table 1-a-b-c-d of this paper. 
Assaad and Krafft also evaluate the representativeness of the ELMPS by comparing it to labor 
force surveys for Egypt. The panel data are five or seven years apart. Workers are observed 
twice or three times in two-year panels of 1998-2006 and 2006-2012 and a three year panel of 
1998-2006-2012. 
 
  We restrict the sample to 15-65 year old wage earners in each sample separately. Those 
who are in education or training are excluded.  Unpaid family workers (UFW) are also excluded 
since their imputable earnings are not observed. The formal private sector includes non-
agricultural, full-time wage-earners who work 30 hours or more per week. The real hourly 
wages are reported in the data set and computed as the monthly wages per hour of work in the 
primary and secondary jobs deflated by the CPI base 2012. The wage determination 
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mechanisms differ vastly across public and private sectors.  In order to make the public and the 
private sector samples comparable in terms of their non-monetary remunerations we consider 
the formal private sector wage-earners and ignore informal private sector wage earners.  The 
sectors are defined such that they are comparable along a number of dimensions. We define 
formal private sector (henceforth private sector) as those wage earners who are covered by the 
social security through their employment and/or who have an employment contract.  Our 
definition of public (or government) sector (henceforth public sector) excludes public enterprise 
workers. In the data set the mean log hourly wage of public enterprise workers is 1.73 while 
that of the government employees is 1.53. Their difference is statistically significant at the one 
percent level. Therefore public enterprise workers are excluded in order not to confound the 
results.     
 
Male and female samples are analyzed separately. The labor force participation of 
women in Egypt is very low. Most of the women are either inactive or work as unpaid family 
workers (Tansel and Ozdemir, 2014). Therefore, the issues of women’s selection both into 
employment and the public-private sector are important to address. This is not a standard 
econometric procedure in the QR framework. We address the sector selection issue in our QR 
estimation. Further, the number of female observations in the private sector is rather small. 
Therefore, in the following sections some of the estimation procedures are not performed for 
the female sample. In such cases we report and comment on the estimates only for the male 
sample. 
 
 Insert Figure 1 about here  
 
  Figure 1 shows the Kernel density estimates of the log hourly wages in the public and 
private sectors. The non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates that  the null 
hypothesis of the sectoral log hourly wages come from the same distribution is rejected at the 
five percent level of significance in all cases except for females in 1998 and males in 2006. For 
females in 2006 and 2012 the distribution of the public sector wages dominate that of the private 
sector. Public sector Kernel density stand to the right of the private sector Kernel density 
indicating that public sector wages exceed that of the private sector throughout the distribution. 
For males in 1998 private sector Kernel density stands slightly to the right of the public sector 
density indicating some public sector penalty in the middle of the distribution. In 2012 the 
public sector Kernel density stands slightly to the right of the private sector density indicating 
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some public sector premium.    
 
Tables 1-a-b-c-d gives the descriptive statistics for the female and male samples in the public 
and private sectors for 1998, 2006, 2012 and for the pooled sample respectively. The figures in 
these tables are adjusted for attrition. the  In Table 1-a for 1998, female log hourly wage in the 
public sector is higher than that of the male while in the private sector male log hourly wage is 
higher than that of the female. Further, male mean log hourly wage is higher in the private than 
in the public sector while opposite hold true for the female log hourly wage. The female log 
hourly wage in the public sector is higher than in the private sector. In 2006 the mean log hourly 
wages are higher than in 1998 and the standard deviations are also higher. This implies higher 
wage inequality in 2006 compared to in 1998. The relative sizes of the public versus private 
sector mean log hourly wages are similar to those observed in 1998. In 2012 the mean log 
hourly wages are higher than in 2006. The standard deviations of log hourly wages in 2012 is 
less than that in 2006.This implies smaller wage inequality in 2012 compared to in 2006. In the 
public sector, contrary to that in 1998 and 2006, the male mean log hourly wage is higher than 
that of the female. In the private sector, similar to 1998 and 2006, the male mean log hourly 
wage is higher than that of the female. Further, for males contrary to that in 1998 and 2006, 
male mean log hourly wage in the public sector is higher than that of in the private sector.  
Similar to that observed in 1998 and 2006, the female log hourly wage in the public sector is 
higher than that in the private sector.        
 
Finally the Table 1-d gives the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample. For men the mean 
log hourly wage is larger in the private sector than in the public sector while the reverse is true 
for women where the mean log hourly wage is substantially larger in the public sector then in 
the private sector. These indicate a public sector penalty for men but a public sector premium 
for women. We comment on the rest of the variable in Table 1-d. The weekly hours of work is 
substantially larger in the private sector than in the public sector especially for females. Both 
females and males are substantially older in the public than in the private sector. In both the 
public and private sectors, women are better educated than men since the female years of 
schooling are larger than that of males in both sectors. Further, men are somewhat better 
educated in the public than in the private sector whereas females are equally well educated in 
both sectors.  A larger percentage of both females and males in public sector are married than 
in the private sector. Similarly, a larger percentage of both females and males in the public 
sector have children. The Rural Upper region has the least percent of female public employees. 
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Nearly half of the female private sector employees are in the Greater Cairo region.  As remarked 
earlier, the total number of female observations in the private sector is rather small. This has 
created problems in some estimation procedures. 
 
 Above explanations refer to the raw differences between the public versus private sectors. 
However, the compositional differences in the characteristics of public versus private sector 
employment are important. For the public sector the educational threshold is higher. 
Employment entry age is also higher. There is greater representation of women in the public 
than in the private sector.  In the rest of this paper we consider the pay gap by controlling for 
the compositional differences between the public and private sectors.  
 
 Insert Tables 1-a-b-c-d about here  
 
5) Conceptual Framework and the Econometric Methodology  
 
Recently panel data became available in many developing countries. In particular, with 
the panel data, estimation of fixed effect (FE) model, that is purging of the effect of 
unobservable characteristics became possible. The FE estimation deals with the issue of 
unobservable characteristics providing consistent estimates assuming that un-observables are 
time invariant. A number of researchers followed this route in studying wage differential 
between formal versus informal sectors both at the mean and at various quantiles.  They include, 
Tansel and Kan (2012) in Turkey, Nguyen et al. (2013) in Vietnam, Bargain and Kwenda (2014) 
in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, Tansel et al. (2015) in Egypt and Nordman et al. (2016) in 
Madagaskar. A common finding is that sectoral earnings differentials either get smaller or 
disappear in these countries when unobservable worker characteristics are controlled for with 
FE estimation exploiting the panel feature of the data. Mahuteau et al. (2017) for Australia 
address the public versus private wage differential employing panel data with a FE model both 
at the mean and across the wage distribution. None of these studies addressed the issue of sector 
of employment selection as we consider in this paper. 
 
Earlier studies in the literature on the sectoral earnings differentials focused on 
estimation at the mean of the earnings distribution. There may be important differentials along 
the earnings distribution due to intrinsic heterogeneity in jobs. This is ignored when only the 
differential at the mean is considered. Recently, researchers addressed the heterogeneity that 
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may exist along the earnings distribution by using QR technique in various contexts.  For 
example, Botelho and Ponczek (2011) in Brazil provided estimates along the earnings 
distribution in the context of formal versus informal sectors. However, while employing QR 
estimation addressing of the estimation problems such as unobserved heterogeneity or sector 
selection becomes difficult. The techniques to deal with these problems are theoretically well 
developed and available but their implementation are rare. Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) 
adopt the QR technique corrected for self-selection using instrumental variables (IV) with a 
cross-sectional data set in Brazil.  Tansel et. al.  (2015) in Egypt, Nguyen et al. (2013) in 
Vietnam, Bargain and Kwenda (2014) in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa and Mahuteau et al. 
(2017) in Australia adopt a fixed effect model estimation with QR technique (FEQR). 
Instrumental variable (IV) methods could be useful in addressing the sector selection issues and 
in order to obtain causal estimates.  However, a suitable instrumental variable could not be 
found in the ELMPS. Therefore, in this paper this method is not employed.  We address the 
sample selection issue that influences the decision to seek public sector employment.   
 
We first estimate several models with sample selection correction. First, we use the 
standard Heckman selection correction with a probit sector of employment selection in the first 
stage and an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) public and private wage equations in the second 
stage.   Second, we estimate Fixed Effects (FE) model at the mean with sample selection. Third, 
we estimate a QR model with sample selection correction.  Unfortunately, we cannot carry out 
a Fixed Effects Quantile Regression (FEQR) model with sample selection correction, because 
to the best of our knowledge the theoretical developments in the estimation of this model is not 
treated. 
 
 In our estimates of various models with sample selection correction, presented in 
Section 4.1, we find that the sample selection term is mostly statistically insignificant. This 
indicates that the non-random sample selection between public and private sectors is not 
important in our data. In the face of this finding our preferred estimates are those without sample 
selection correction. These estimates include utilization of OLS, FE, QR and FEQR techniques. 
They are explained in Section 4.2. The conceptual framework is based on the Mincer earnings 
equation. It is estimated with a dummy variable indicator for the public sector. Namely, we 
consider the earnings gap for the two sectors and ascertain whether this gap favors public sector 
or the private sector. We carry out the estimations at the mean of the wage distribution and at 
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various quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. In this process we employ the OLS, FE 
QR and FEQR techniques. 
 
5.1) Models with Sample Selection Correction 
Heckman two-step method involves two steps. In the first step we estimate a simple 
probit model for the probabilities of workers selecting public or the private sector. In the first 
step we estimate the probit equation by maximum likelihood method and compute the Inverse 
Mills Ratio (IMR). In the second step we estimate the wage offer equation by OLS by including 
the IMR as an additional variable. Our second set of estimates are FE estimates with sample 
selection correction.  In this process we use the panel feature of the data. We first estimate a 
panel probit model and compute the IMR. In this process we use a Random Effects (RE) model. 
In the estimation of the wage equation, we perform a Hausmann test of whether FE or RE 
estimation is suitable. The test results indicated that FE model is preferable. Therefore, in the 
second step we estimate a FE model of the wage equation expanded with IMR 
.     
Our third set of estimates are QR estimates with sample selection correction. There are 
very few applications of this method. We have located the applications by Buchinski (2001), 
Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002), Huber and Melly (2011) and Coelho et.al. (2008). The 
method is developed by Buchinsky (1998) based on non-parametric method. This is a variant 
of the standard Heckman two-step estimation method developed for the mean regression by 
Heckman (1979) and extended by Newey (1999). In the first step, we use a model similar to 
probit model for sector selection but rather than assuming normality we use the semi-parametric 
method developed by Ichimura (1993) called Semi-Parametric Least Squares (SLS). The 
estimates are consistent and asymptotically normal.    Following Buchinsky (1998), in the 
second step the quantile wage equation is expanded with power series expansion of IMR in 
order to control for sector selection. Details of this procedure are given in Buchinski (1988; 
2001) and Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto. We provide a summary of this procedure in Appendix-
B.   
 
5.2) Models without Sample Selection Correction   
 
The OLS model is estimated on a sample of pooled panel observations of individual-
year pairs as follows. 
 
13 
 
itititit xIy           (1) 
 
We correct the standard errors to reflect the fact that we use observations from the same 
person are used two or three times. Next we use panel feature of the data and estimate a FE 
model where we control for time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity. The FE 
estimator is consistent as long as unobserved characteristics are constant over time. The FE 
model is specified as follows. 
 
  itiititit xIy          (2) 
 
In models (1) and (2) ity  is log hourly wages, itx  is the vector of control variables for 
individual i at time t including a constant, itI  is a dummy variable taking a value one if the 
wage earner is in the public sector at time t. The private sector worker is the base category. i  
is the individual fixed effect. it  is a normally, independently and identically distributed 
stochastic error term with zero conditional mean. The estimated   measures the public 
employment penalty/premium. 
 
Next we investigate the public sector wage penalty/premium along the conditional wage 
distribution using QR.  The standard QR method is then extended to using panel data and we 
estimate the FEQR model. Estimating the QR models are especially important since the 
conditional earnings differentials across different quantiles proxy for unobservable earnings 
potential. The QR and FEQR models can be written as in equations (3) and (4) as follows 
respectively. 
 
 1,0    ,)()()()(   ititititit xGIyq     (3) 
 
 1,0    ,)()()(   itiititit xIyq      (4) 
 
Where, )( ityq  is the log hourly wages at the
th  quantile. i  are the individual fixed effects 
that    shift the location of the conditional quantiles  in the same manner across the quantiles. 
However, the effects of the explanatory variables differ by the quantiles considered. The vector 
of estimated coefficients )(  provide the estimated rates of return to the different covariates 
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at the  %th quantile and the estimated coefficient )(  represents public sector wage 
penalty/premium at the various quantiles. The FEQR technique was first suggested by Koenker 
(2004) as a direct extension of the standard QR method. However it was Canay (2011) who 
provided an implementation procedure. He suggested a simple two-step approach for FEQR 
estimation. In the first step the individual effects are estimated by traditional mean estimations 
such as FE estimation. The individual fixed effects are pure location shifters. Then predicted 
individual effects are used to correct earnings as in iii yy ˆˆ  . The corrected earnings are then 
used in the traditional QR estimation. 
 
In all of the model specifications given above following control variables are used. Age, 
age squared, years of education, marital status, presence of children, sectors of economic 
activity, regions of location and time dummies for survey waves. The time indicators for 2006 
and 2012, control for the effect of macroeconomic environment on wages over the survey years. 
The base year is 1998. The effects of differences in the structure of sectors on wages are 
considered by including dummies for the five sectors of economic activity. They are 
manufacturing (including mining and electricity), construction, trade, transportation, and 
services (including finance). The base sector is manufacturing. The six regions of residence are 
Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Suez, Urban Lower, Urban Upper, Rural Lower and Rural 
Upper. The base region is Greater Cairo.  
 
6) Estimation Results with Sample Selection Correction 
 
Table 2 presents the probit and panel probit estimates of employment sector selection. 
These are first stage estimates. Using these results we subsequently present the selectivity 
corrected wage equation estimates in Table 3 by including IMR as an additional variable. Table 
2 estimates include other-public, other-private, marital status and number of children as the 
identifying variables of the probit models.  Other-public is the number of household members 
working in the public sector other than the individual her/himself. Other-private is the number 
of household members working in the private sector other than the individual her/himself. In 
both the probit and panel probit estimates other-public and other-probit variables are 
statistically significant with positive and negative signs respectively. Presence of other 
household members working in the public sector increases the individual’s probability of 
working in both the public and the private sectors. Presence of other household members 
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working in the private sector increases the individual’s probability of working in both the public 
and the private sectors.  These variables achieve the identification of the sector of employment 
selection. Individual’s being married is statistically significant only in the female sample. 
 
 Insert Table 2 about here  
 
Table 3 presents the Mincer wage equations with selection correction by gender in the 
OLS (standard Heckman) models and in the FE models. The estimates of the selection term, 
lambda, are all statistically insignificant except for males in the FE estimates of the public sector 
indicating a negative selection into the public sector for males.  Age and age-squared are mostly 
statistically significant with positive and negative signs respectively. Years of schooling are all 
significant in the OLS estimates indicating similar returns to schooling for females in the public 
and private sectors. For males the returns to schooling are higher in the public than in the private 
sector. In the FE estimates the returns to schooling are similar in the public and private sectors 
for females but insignificant for males. The insignificance of lambda in these estimates leads 
us to conclude that sector selection is not important issue in our sample. 
 
 Insert Table 3 about here  
 
Table 4 presents the Semi-Parametric Least Squares (SLS) estimates of the employment 
sector choice by gender. The models are identified by including following variables as defined 
above. They are other-public, other-private, married and number of children. The probability 
of working in the public sector first increases then decreases with age both in the public and 
private sectors for both males and females (insignificant).  Years of schooling increases the 
probability of working in the public sector for both females and males. The other-public 
increases the probability of working in the public sector and decreases the probability of 
working in the private sector for males. For females this variable increases both the probability 
of working in the public sector and the private sector (insignificant). For females being married 
increases the probability of working in the public sector but decreases the probability of 
working in the private sector. For males being married reduces the probability of working in 
the public sector and the private sector (insignificant). For females the number of children 
reduces the probability of working in both the public (insignificant) and the private sectors. For 
males it increases the probability of working in both the public and private sectors. The presence 
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of public sector employment decreases in 2006 and 2012 compared to 1998 which is expected 
due to recent public sector retrenchment.  
 
 Insert Table 4 about here  
 
In the second step QR models with selection correction are estimated. The IMR 
polynomials from the first stage SLS estimates are included as additional regressors. Table 5 
for females and Table 6 for males present the QR estimation of the selection corrected wage 
equations. For females the selection term, lambda, is statistically significant only in the q10 and 
q25 the lower two quantiles. This leads us to conclude that selection term is mostly insignificant 
and therefore not important in our data. There is positive selection to the public sector in the 
lowest two quantiles. Selection to the private sector is insignificant. For males there is negative 
selection to the public sector and the private sector in the upper quantiles of the conditional 
wage distribution.  The positive selection term for females at lower quantiles imply that females 
receive higher wages at the public sector  at low wages than one would expect based on their 
observable characteristics. At the private sector at all quantiles workers earn as much as 
expected based on their observable characteristics. The negative selection terms at upper 
quantiles for males imply that high income public sector workers earn less than one would 
expect based on their observable characteristics.  Similarly for the private sector workers in the 
sense that there is negative selection in the private sector well. 
 
 Insert Table 5 about here  
 Insert Table 6 about here  
   
The coefficient estimate of the years of schooling are statistically significant at all 
quantiles for both females and males. They are higher for low wage individuals. They indicate 
a returns to schooling of around 7-8% for the females which is decreasing across the quantiles. 
And about 6 % for males which is somewhat lower than for females in both the public and 
private sectors. 
 
Oaxaca- Blinder Decomposition: 
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Table 7-a shows the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of public-private wage differentials by 
gender and male-female wage differentials by sector of employment. In the case of differentials 
between sectors of employment the observed and unobserved components are larger for males 
than for females. For both females and males the unobservable components are larger than the 
observable components. For males the unobservable component favor the private sector. In the 
case of the differential between male and female workers the observable components favor 
females. The unobservable component for females is larger than that of the males. Table 7-b 
shows the decompositions by quantiles with and without sample selection correction.   
                                        Insert Table 7-a-b about here  
 
7) Estimation Results without Sample Selection Correction 
7.1) Main Results 
 
The main estimation results are summarized in Table 8. These are based on the full 
estimation results presented in the Appendix-A.  We first discuss the results for males.   Most 
of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant at one percent level. The OLS estimate 
indicates a statistically significant public sector penalty of about 14 percent. The Quantile 
Regression (QR) estimates also indicate statistically significant penalties except at the lowest 
quantile. The penalties increase in magnitude across the quantiles. The next row in this table 
gives the Fixed Effect (FE) and the Fixed Effect Quantile Regression (FEQR) estimates where 
the unobservable factors are taken into account in addition to the observable ones. The FE 
estimate shows a public sector penalty of about 28 percent which is much higher than the OLS 
estimate. In contrast Mahuteau (2017) find a smaller public sector premium with FE estimation 
than with the OLS.  The FEQR estimates are also larger than the QR estimates. They are rather 
stable across the quantiles around 22-30 percent.  Mahuteau et al. find slightly higher premium 
for women than for men and their FEQT estimates indicate a larger premium at the bottom than 
at the top of the wage distribution. 
  
 Insert Table 8 about here  
 
Next we discuss the results for females.  Most coefficient estimates are statistically 
significant. These results indicate a public sector premium. OLS gives a statistically significant 
premium of about 11 percent. The QR estimates indicate a decrease in the premium across the 
quantiles from about 18 percent at the bottom quantile to about 14 percent at the median. The 
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top two quantiles are not statistically significant indicating that at the high levels of wages the 
public versus private sector wages do not differ. The FE estimate of the wage gap is not 
statistically significant. This implies that on average the public-private sector wages do not 
differ significantly when unobservable factors are controlled for. 
A common finding in several studies indicate that public sector wage premium is larger 
at the low end of the wage distribution than at the top end of the wage distribution. For instance 
Birch (2006) and Cai and Liu (2011) find this for Australia with QR estimates. They also find 
public sector penalty for men at the top of the wage distribution. Another general finding is that 
public sector premium is larger for women and workers with low pay. Similar to our results 
Vella (1993) and Siminsky (2013)  find in Australia a premium for women but no statistically 
significant difference for men while  Cai and Liu (2011) find a premium for women and a 
penalty for men similar to our results for Egypt.     
 
7.2) Results for Various Sub-Samples 
 
Results by Education 
 
The estimation results of the public sector gap for various levels of education are given 
in Table 9 for the male sample. Estimates for the female sample cannot be performed due to 
estimation problems. . For education level, less than primary, the FE estimate and of the bottom 
quantile is not statistically significant.  The rest of the quantile estimates indicate statistically 
significant public sector penalties of increasing magnitude across the quantiles. For the 
education level of less than intermediate, the FE and the bottom quantile estimates are not 
statistically significant. For the rest of the quantiles there is statistically significant public sector 
premium of increasing magnitude across the quantiles. For the education level of intermediate 
and above all of the coefficient estimates are statistically significant. The FE estimate indicates 
a mean penalty of about 31 percent. The FEQR estimates indicate that the penalties decrease 
across quantiles. For the education level of university and above the FE estimate indicates a 
mean penalty of about 43 percent. The FEQR estimates indicate penalties of increasing 
magnitude across the quantiles. In general we can say that the highest penalties are observed at 
the highest education level of university and above. 
 
 Insert Table 9 about here  
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Table 10 bottom panel gives the FE and FEQR estimates for the two subsamples by 
education for the male sample. The estimations cannot be performed for the female sample.  
For the subsample of less educated where the years of schooling is less than the mean years of 
schooling of the sample the FE public sector wage gap is not statistically significant. The FEQR 
estimates all of the quantiles indicate statistically significant public sector penalty of declining 
magnitude across the quantiles. For the subsample of better educated where the years of 
schooling is greater than the mean years of schooling of the sample the FE public sector penalty 
is statistically significant and is about 35 percent. The FEQR estimates are all statistically 
significant and range between 30-37 percent. We can conclude that the public sector penalty 
for the better educated is much larger than for the less educated. 
 
 Insert Table 10 about here  
 
Results by Age and Time Periods 
 
The results by age are given in Table 10 for the male sample. We consider age as a 
proxy for experience.  We consider two subsamples of less experienced where the age is less 
than the mean age and the subsample of better experienced where the age is greater than the 
mean age of the sample.  There is statistically significant public sector penalty except in the FE 
estimate for the old sample.  For the young the FE penalty is about 35 percent. The FEQR 
estimates are relatively stable across the quantiles.  For the old the FE estimate is not statistically 
significant. The FEQR estimates are all statistically significant and somewhat increase across 
quantiles. 
 
Table 10 also shows the results for the two time periods for the male sample. For the 
1998-2006 time period the FE estimate is not statistically significant. The statistically 
significant FEQR estimates indicate relatively large public sector penalties which are more or 
less stable across the quantiles. For the 2006-2012 period all of the coefficient estimates are 
statistically significant. The FE estimates indicates a public sector penalty of about 20 percent. 
The FEQR estimates show that the penalty range between 19-22 percent across the quantiles.  
We can conclude that the public sector penalty is lower for the more recent period implying a 
decline in penalty over time. 
 
Results by Region  
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Public sector pay gap across the regions of a country is addressed in several studies. For 
instance, Dell’Aringa et al. (2007) for Italy, Garcia-Perez and Jimenez (2007) for Spain and 
Heitmuller and Mavromaras (2007) for Germany addressed the regional public-private sector 
pay issues. Public sector pay is uniform across regions in Egypt due to strong central 
government. Therefore, the observed penalty we discuss below, is a result of the differentials 
across the regions in the private sector pay. 
 
Table 11 presents the average log hourly wages by gender and region. We observe that 
in all of the regions the average log hourly wages for females is lower than that of males. In the 
male sample the average log hourly wage is highest in Greater Cairo and lowest in Rural Lower. 
In the female sample the average log hourly wage is also highest in Greater Cairo but lowest in 
Rural Upper. Table 12 presents the FE and FEQR estimates of the public versus private wage 
gap for the regions for the male sample. The FE estimates are not statistically significant for 
Greater Cairo, Alexandria and Suez Canal and Rural upper. The Table indicates a public sector 
penalty in all regions. These estimates are all statistically significant in all regions in all 
quantiles except a few in the case of Rural Upper.  All of the regions exhibit a non-monotonic 
pattern. For the Greater Cairo the public sector penalty ranges between 12-24 percent; for 
Alexandria and Suez Canal it ranges between 19-30 percent;   for Urban Lower it ranges 
between 40-53 percent; for Urban Upper it ranges between 16-26 percent;  for Rural Lower it 
ranges between 38-47 percent and finally for Rural Upper it is about 5-6 percent when 
statistically significant. For the last region the estimates for the most quantiles are not 
statistically significant implying that the public and private sector wages do not significantly 
differ from each other at those quantiles for the Rural Upper.   We observe that the highest 
penalty is at region Urban Lower. This is followed by Rural Lower.  The Rural Upper exhibits 
the lowest public sector penalty among all of the regions. It is a general finding in the literature 
that public sector premium is higher in the poorer regions of the country and lower in the 
wealthier regions.  Such findings imply that in the poor regions private sector may face 
difficulty in hiring high quality employees and in the wealthier regions public sector may find 
difficulty in retaining high quality work force. However we do not know about the wealth 
comparison of the regions of Egypt to make any conclusions. 
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 Insert Table 11 about here  
 Insert Table 12 about here  
 
 
8) Conclusions 
 
This study investigates the public versus private sector wage gap using Egypt Labor 
Market Panel Survey (ELMPS) carried out in 1998, 2006 and 2012.  We estimate the public 
and private sector wage equations using the standard Heckman model, the FE model with 
sample selection and with the QR model with sample selection. To the best of our knowledge 
we provide one of the few applications of the QR model with sample selection correction.  We 
also present the Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions at the mean and at different quantiles. Returns 
to education are somewhat larger for females than for males. They decrease across quantiles 
for females and it is similar across the quantiles for males.     
 
Our results for the selectivity corrected wage equations lead us to conclude that sector 
selection is not significant in our data.  Therefore, for the rest of our study we investigate the 
public sector wage gap without sector selection correction. Making use of the panel feature of 
the data we estimate FE and FEQR whereby we take into account both the observable and the 
unobservable characteristics.  We find significant gender differences. Our findings indicate a 
persistent public sector wage penalty for males and public sector wage premium for females in 
several alternative estimates. The public sector wage penalty for males is larger when 
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account but the public sector wage premium for females 
becomes insignificant when unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. The premium we 
find for women may be due to  gender equality in pay in the public sector in Egypt and large 
pay discrimination for women in the private sector.  The quantile regression estimates give an 
idea about the extent of the penalty or premium across the conditional wage distribution. The 
penalties for males are   similar across the quantiles while premiums for females are smaller at 
the top than at the bottom of the conditional wage distribution.  A comparison of QR and FEQR 
estimates imply that high paid male workers are more able in the private sector than in the 
public sector. A comparison of the OLS and FE estimates for men (where FE penalty is larger 
than the OLS) imply that private sector workers are more able than the public sector workers. 
Similar comparison for women (where OLS premium disappears with FE) implies that public 
sector workers are more able than those in the private sector. One implication is that given the 
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finding of penalty for males and premium for females policy makers should set the severance 
payments accordingly.  
 
We further examine the public sector wage penalty for males in different sub-samples 
according to education, age and time period. These subsample estimates provide interesting 
insight about the structure of the wages in the public and private sectors. The public sector wage 
penalty for males is larger for the better educated and the younger and has decreased recently 
over time.  We also find substantial regional differences in public sector wage gap for males.  
The highest penalty is at region Urban Lower. This is followed by Rural Lower.  The Rural 
Upper exhibits the lowest public sector penalty among all of the regions.  
 
This study provides valuable information about the workings of the labor markets in the 
public and private sectors in Egypt.  The analysis provides information about factors that 
underline the earnings differentials between these sectors.  An understanding of these 
observable and unobservable factors will be useful for providing policy relevant guidelines   for 
the administrators in the public sector employment and for the leaders of the private sector 
employment in Egypt. 
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Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of Log Hourly Wage in Public and Private Sector by 
Gender, Egypt, 1998, 2006 and 2012. 
 
 
 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. The top panel is for total sample. The 
middle panel is for the female sample.  The bottom panel is for the male sample. 
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TABLE 1a: Descriptive Statistics for Public and Private Sector by Gender, Egypt, 1998 
 
  
Female   Male  
 Wage Earner  Wage Earner 
VARIABLES   Public Private  Public Private 
  mean mean  mean mean 
Log Hourly Wage 
 
1.32 1.2  1.23 1.39 
  (0.63) (0.78)  (0.63) (0.65) 
Weekly Hours 
 
38.83 44.84  49.97 54.96 
  (8.01) (11.86)  (17.20) (16.77) 
Age 
 
37.21 31.45  41.57 35.01 
  (8.93) (10.93)  (9.74) (10.01) 
Age Squared/100 
 
14.64 11.08  18.23 13.26 
  (697.31) (821.84)  (819.17) (755.77) 
Years of Schooling 
 
13.52 13.35  10.97 10.02 
  (2.53) (3.18)  (5.01) (4.96) 
Household Size 
 
4.82 4.98  5.96 5.75 
  (1.85) (1.36)  (2.69) (3.04) 
Marital Status 
   
   
single 
 
20.7 51.2  14.2 35.3 
married 
 
79.3 48.8  85.8 64.7 
Children 
   
   
no child 
 
27.9 40.5  21.3 31.1 
with child 
 
72.1 59.5  78.7 68.9 
Firm Size 
   
   
1 - 4  
 
15.6 15.6  25.1 25.1 
5 - 9  
 
10.3 10.3  10.4 10.4 
10 - 24  
 
15.5 15.5  15.3 15.3 
30 - 49  
 
8.7 8.7  8.3 8.3 
50 - 99  
 
19.8 19.8  8.6 8.6 
More than 100  
 
30.1 30.1  32.2 32.2 
Sector 
   
   
Manufacturing 
 
1.5 20.9  5.2 41.6 
Construction 
 
0.1 5.5  0.2 8.3 
Trade 
 
0.2 20.1  0.8 15.3 
Transportation 
 
1.8 2.4  6.4 21.5 
Finance and Services 
 
96.5 51.1  87.4 13.4 
Region 
   
   
Greater. Cairo 
 
22.4 58.1  14.6 38.1 
Alexandria, Sz C. 
 
13.7 11.5  6.8 17.4 
Urban Lower 
 
17.9 5.7  12.6 9.4 
Urban Upper 
 
15.9 8.9  12.2 7.2 
Rural Lower 
 
24.1 10.4  31.8 19.8 
Rural Upper 
 
6 5.4  22 8.1 
Year 
   
   
1998 
 
93.34 6.66  78.22 21.78 
       
Number of Obs. 
 
575 41  1031 287 
Total Number of Obs.  616 
616 
 1318 
1318 Total Number of ID's   
Source: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998.  
Notes: 1) The descriptive statistics in this table use the weighted observations which take attrition into account.  
           2) Log hourly wage is in Egyptian pounds real 2012 prices deflated using consumer price index. 
           3) Standard deviations are in parenthesis for the continuous variables. 
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TABLE 1b: Descriptive Statistics for Public and Private Sector by Gender, Egypt, 2006   
Female  Male  
Wage Earner  Wage Earner 
VARIABLES   Public Private  Public Private 
  mean mean  mean mean 
Log Hourly Wage 
 
1.64 1.30  1.60 1.64 
  (0.72) (0.79)  (0.79) (0.76) 
Weekly Hours 
 
41.07 49.22  51.63 58.67 
  (8.37) (12.04)  (17.49) (22.16) 
Age 
 
40.19 30.86  42.34 34.35 
  (9.59) (9.77)  (9.91) (10.16) 
Age Squared/100 
 
17.07 10.48  18.91 12.83 
  (761.50) (688.41)  (834.03) (778.09) 
Years of Schooling 
 
13.61 12.97  11.73 10.37 
  (2.93) (3.50)  (4.82) (4.87) 
Household Size 
 
4.54 5.06  5.42 5.11 
  (1.71) (1.85)  (2.33) (2.42) 
Marital Status 
   
   
single 
 
22.4 62  12.2 32.6 
married 
 
77.6 38  87.8 67.4 
Children 
   
   
no child 
 
40.7 59.2  26.5 41.6 
with child 
 
59.3 40.8  73.5 58.4 
Firm Size 
   
   
1 - 4  
 
6 6  28 28 
5 - 9  
 
5.4 5.4  8.1 8.1 
10 - 24  
 
23.7 23.7  11.3 11.3 
30 - 49  
 
18.8 18.8  9.1 9.1 
50 - 99  
 
11.5 11.5  10.7 10.7 
More than 100  
 
34.5 34.5  32.8 32.8 
Sector 
   
   
Manufacturing 
 
1.9 34.5  4.5 37.3 
Construction 
 
0.1 2.7  0.6 7.5 
Trade 
 
0.2 15.7  0.4 13.3 
Transportation 
 
1.5 8.7  5.3 22.8 
Finance and Services 
 
96.3 38.4  89.1 19 
Region 
   
   
Greater. Cairo 
 
24 50.5  16.7 32.5 
Alexandria, Sz C. 
 
12.1 16  6.1 14.5 
Urban Lower 
 
17.1 8.8  10.8 10.2 
Urban Upper 
 
14.6 4.6  11 5 
Rural Lower 
 
25.6 18.3  35.2 23.9 
Rural Upper 
 
6.6 1.8  20.3 13.8 
Year 
   
   
2006 
 
87.88 12.12  69.26 30.74 
       
Number of Obs. 
 
928 128  1719 763 
Total Number of Obs.  1056 
1056 
 2482 
2482 Total Number of ID's   
Source: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 2006.  
Notes: 1) The descriptive statistics in this table use the weighted observations which take attrition into account.  
           2) Log hourly wage is in Egyptian pounds real 2012 prices deflated using consumer price index. 
           3) Standard deviations are in parenthesis for the continuous variables. 
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TABLE 1c: Descriptive Statistics for Public and Private Sector by Gender, Egypt, 2012   
Female  Male  
Wage Earner  Wage Earner 
VARIABLES   Public Private  Public Private   
mean mean  mean mean 
Log Hourly Wage 
 
1.68 1.47  1.74 1.66 
  (0.69) (0.68)  (0.74) (0.75) 
Weekly Hours 
 
37.93 44.97  49.56 54.14 
  (8.62) (10.27)  (18.72) (15.95) 
Age 
 
40.96 33.04  43.41 36.09 
  (10.36) (9.85)  (9.58) (9.93) 
Age Squared/100 
 
17.85 11.89  19.76 14.01 
  (847.82) (759.45)  (819.92) (789.03) 
Years of Schooling 
 
13.86 13.29  12.29 11.38 
  (2.52) (3.31)  (4.10) (4.09) 
Household Size 
 
4.15 4.25  4.87 4.33 
  (1.43) (1.32)  (1.79) (1.57) 
Marital Status 
   
   
single 
 
22.1 60.4  8.9 23.9 
married 
 
77.9 39.6  91.1 76.1 
Children 
   
   
no child 
 
58.4 73.2  42.2 57.7 
with child 
 
41.6 26.8  57.8 42.3 
Firm Size 
   
   
1 - 4  
 
0.8 3.1  6 22 
5 - 9  
 
2 5.4  3 5.5 
10 - 24  
 
8 6.7  10.6 7.5 
30 - 49  
 
19.2 17.5  14.5 8 
50 - 99  
 
22 20.5  16.9 9 
More than 100  
 
47.9 46.7  49.1 48.1 
Sector 
   
   
Manufacturing 
 
1.9 26.2  8.2 36.8 
Construction 
 
0 3.3  0.6 4.9 
Trade 
 
0.8 7.4  0.8 14.3 
Transportation 
 
0.9 4  5.6 17.4 
Finance and Services 
 
96.4 59.1  84.8 26.6 
Region 
   
   
Greater. Cairo 
 
22.8 47.6  16.3 35.1 
Alexandria, Sz C. 
 
11.4 20.6  6.7 14 
Urban Lower 
 
16.9 6.1  11 10.3 
Urban Upper 
 
13.8 4.5  11.8 6.5 
Rural Lower 
 
27.3 16.3  36 25.4 
Rural Upper 
 
7.7 4.9  18.1 8.7 
Year 
   
   
2012 
 
89.5 10.5  66.01 33.99 
       
Number of Obs. 
 
921 108  1542 794 
Total Number of Obs. 
 
1029 
1029 
 2336 
2336 Total Number of ID's 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 2012.  
Notes: 1) The descriptive statistics in this table use the weighted observations which take attrition into account.  
           2) Log hourly wage is in Egyptian pounds real 2012 prices deflated using consumer price index. 
           3) Standard deviations are in parenthesis for the continuous variables. 
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Table 1d: Descriptive Statistics for Public and Private Sector by Gender, Egypt, 1998-2012 
 
 
 
Female  
Wage Earner 
 Male  
Wage Earner 
VARIABLES  Public Private  Public Private  
 
 
mean mean  mean mean 
Log Hourly Wage  
 
1.58 1.36  1.54 1.61  
 
 
0.71 0.76  0.76 0.75 
Weekly Hours  
 
39.35 46.76  50.49 56.15  
 
 
(8.49) (11.51)  (17.83) (19.01) 
Age  
 
39.7 31.85  42.45 35.19  
 
 
(9.83) (10.05)  (9.78) (10.07) 
Age Squared/100  
 
16.72 11.16  18.98 13.39  
 
 
(788.79) (743.90)  (827.43) (780.73) 
Years of Schooling  
 
13.68 13.16  11.68 10.73  
 
 
(2.69) (3.38)  (4.69) (4.62) 
Household Size  
 
4.47 4.72  5.4 4.9  
 
 
(1.58) (1.36)  (1.54) (1.61) 
Marital Status  
   
   
single  
 
21.9 59.6  11.8 29.5 
married  
 
78.1 40.4  88.2 70.5 
Children  
   
   
no child  
 
43.8 61.9  30 46.5 
with child  
 
56.2 38.1  70 53.5 
Firm Size  
   
   
1 - 4   
 
0.8 6.2  6 25 
5 - 9   
 
2 6.2  3 7.4 
10 - 24   
 
8 15.2  10.6 10.4 
30 - 49   
 
19.2 16.7  14.5 8.5 
50 - 99   
 
22 16.6  16.9 9.6 
More than 100   
 
47.9 39.1  49.1 39.1 
Sector  
   
   
Manufacturing  
 
1.8 28.9  5.9 37.8 
Construction  
 
0.1 3.4  0.5 6.6 
Trade  
 
0.4 13  0.7 14.1 
Transportation  
 
1.4 5.7  5.7 20.3 
Finance and Services  
 
96.4 49  87.3 21.2 
Region  
   
   
Greater. Cairo  
 
23.1 50.5  16 34.6 
Alexandria, Sz C.  
 
12.3 17.2  6.5 14.8 
Urban Lower  
 
17.2 7.2  11.4 10.1 
Urban Upper  
 
14.7 5.2  11.6 6 
Rural Lower  
 
25.8 16.2  34.5 23.8 
Rural Upper  
 
6.8 3.7  20.1 10.7 
Year  
   
   
1998  
 
26 16.3  29.3 17.3 
2006  
 
37.8 42.4  39.2 41.3 
2012  
 
36.2 41.2  31.5 41.5 
Number of Obs.   2,424 277  4292 1844 
Total Number of Obs.   2701  6136 
3780 Total Number of ID's   1538  
Source: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006 and 2012.  
Notes: 1) The descriptive statistics in this table use the weighted observations which take attrition into account.  
           2) Log hourly wage is in Egyptian pounds real 2012 prices deflated using consumer price index. 
           3) Standard deviations are in parenthesis for the continuous variables. 
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TABLE 2: Probit and Panel-Probit Estimates of Employment Sector Choice by Gender, Egypt, 
1998-2012 
 Female  
Wage Earner 
 Male  
Wage Earner 
 (Probit) (Panel Probit)  (Probit) (Panel Probit) 
Variables Public Public  Public Public 
      
Other_ public 0.190** 0.502**  0.280*** 0.719*** 
 (0.0911) (0.200)  (0.0583) (0.162) 
Other_ private -0.571*** -1.241***  -0.459*** -0.877*** 
 (0.111) (0.266)  (0.0869) (0.238) 
Age  0.0669** 0.138**  0.109*** 0.274*** 
 (0.0309) (0.0662)  (0.0190) (0.0509) 
Age Squared -0.000456 -0.000881  -0.000793*** -0.00195*** 
 (0.0401) (0.0858)  (0.0231) (0.0596) 
Married  0.358*** 0.783***  0.0460 -0.00318 
 (0.0944) (0.208)  (0.0714) (0.164) 
Children  0.0459 0.114  0.0162 0.0134 
 (0.0950) (0.190)  (0.0510) (0.118) 
Years of Schooling 0.0410*** 0.0874***  0.0341*** 0.0965*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0334)  (0.00542) (0.0159) 
Sector      
Construction -0.326 -0.534  -0.364*** -1.131*** 
 (0.570) (1.001)  (0.141) (0.402) 
Trade -0.371 -0.840  -0.722*** -1.773*** 
 (0.295) (0.661)  (0.117) (0.337) 
Transportation 0.821*** 1.881***  0.296*** 0.481** 
 (0.258) (0.683)  (0.0711) (0.222) 
Finance & Services 1.663*** 3.300***  1.713*** 3.661*** 
 (0.144) (0.590)  (0.0567) (0.338) 
Region      
Alexandria, Sz C. 0.192 0.449  0.00686 -0.0392 
 (0.121) (0.312)  (0.0767) (0.234) 
Urban Lower 0.731*** 1.616***  0.330*** 0.729*** 
 (0.140) (0.439)  (0.0787) (0.227) 
Urban Upper 0.691*** 1.435***  0.507*** 1.292*** 
 (0.127) (0.383)  (0.0733) (0.234) 
Rural Lower 0.825*** 1.744***  0.587*** 1.500*** 
 (0.144) (0.416)  (0.0688) (0.229) 
Rural Upper 0.532*** 1.075**  0.712*** 1.814*** 
 (0.190) (0.477)  (0.0813) (0.261) 
Year      
2006 -0.289** -0.672***  -0.390*** -1.007*** 
 (0.116) (0.215)  (0.0632) (0.134) 
2012 -0.368*** -0.868***  -0.581*** -1.503*** 
 (0.121) (0.263)  (0.0659) (0.182) 
Constant -2.901*** -6.002***  -3.847*** -9.416*** 
 (0.587) (1.456)  (0.358) (1.141) 
      
Log likelihood -557.182   -2067.065  
chi2(18) 666.65 62.19  3360.86 165.38 
Log pseudo-likelihood  -512.95   -1860.058 
Pseudo R2 0.3743   0.4484  
Observations 2,697 2,697  6,131 6,131 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
            2) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
            3) Panel Probit are perform with Random Effects Probit Model, we also tested whether FE or RE model 
is to be preferred. However, could not perform FE Probit model with our panel data. Therefore, panel probit 
estimates are from RE model.
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TABLE 3: Mincer Earnings Equations with Sample Selection Correction, OLS and Fixed Effects, Egypt, 1998-2012  
 Female  
Wage Earner 
 Male  
Wage Earner 
 Female  
Wage Earner 
 Male  
Wage Earner 
 (Public) (Private)  (Public)  (Private)  (Public) (Private)  (Public) (Private) 
Variables OLS OLS  OLS  OLS  FE FE  FE FE 
             
Age 0.0326*** 0.0372  0.0401***  0.0515***  0.0375* 0.0471**  0.0496*** 0.0723*** 
 (0.00992) (0.0242)  (0.00943)  (0.0124)  (0.0207) (0.0223)  (0.0168) (0.0183) 
Age Squared -0.0000357 -0.00018  -0.00016  -0.00046***  -0.00054*** -0.00062***  -0.00045*** -0.00062*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0316)  (0.0105)  (0.0149)  (0.0180) (0.0189)  (0.0137) (0.0144) 
Years of Schooling 0.0673*** 0.0658***  0.0686***  0.0415***  0.0321* 0.0351*  -0.00101 0.00689 
 (0.00467) (0.0114)  (0.00248)  (0.00467)  (0.0192) (0.0196)  (0.0121) (0.0125) 
Sector             
Construction -0.676 0.558**  0.0105  0.228***  0.0834 0.0239  0.0573 -0.104 
 (0.415) (0.258)  (0.143)  (0.0745)  (0.598) (0.442)  (0.164) (0.157) 
Trade -0.0350 -0.245*  -0.360***  -0.168***  -0.0604 -0.171  0.277* 0.0145 
 (0.263) (0.128)  (0.129)  (0.0579)  (0.222) (0.255)  (0.144) (0.111) 
Transportation -0.355** 0.227  -0.0588  0.183***  -0.110 0.0213  0.0384 0.0690 
 (0.153) (0.188)  (0.0586)  (0.0476)  (0.258) (0.282)  (0.108) (0.109) 
Finance & Services -0.335** -0.248  -0.126  0.0469  -0.265* -0.0915  -0.303*** 0.0167 
 (0.138) (0.184)  (0.0876)  (0.128)  (0.157) (0.202)  (0.0996) (0.139) 
Region             
Alexandria, Sz C. -0.114*** -0.0594  -0.0443  -0.0815  0.0295 0.0605  0.429 0.379 
 (0.0444) (0.0982)  (0.0442)  (0.0497)  (0.311) (0.534)  (0.606) (0.607) 
Urban Lower -0.172*** -0.415**  -0.179***  -0.125**  -0.399* -0.336  0.471 0.489 
 (0.0473) (0.164)  (0.0405)  (0.0597)  (0.229) (0.510)  (0.606) (0.607) 
Urban Upper -0.147*** -0.248*  -0.115***  -0.187***  -0.286 -0.259  -0.0974 0.0448 
 (0.0451) (0.146)  (0.0390)  (0.0641)  (0.224) (0.464)  (0.549) (0.551) 
Rural Lower -0.158*** -0.508***  -0.250***  -0.276***  -0.320 -0.254  0.588 0.629 
 (0.0506) (0.141)  (0.0394)  (0.0606)  (0.277) (0.520)  (0.616) (0.618) 
Rural Upper -0.141** -0.721***  -0.163***  -0.179**  -0.0183 0.00827  -0.162 0.00696 
 (0.0631) (0.216)  (0.0439)  (0.0763)  (0.157) (0.422)  (0.483) (0.488) 
Year             
2006 0.202*** 0.159  0.276***  0.223***  0.519*** 0.487***  0.421*** 0.345*** 
 (0.0320) (0.113)  (0.0273)  (0.0537)  (0.121) (0.108)  (0.0867) (0.0936) 
2012 0.220*** 0.288**  0.329***  0.178***  0.781*** 0.738***  0.561*** 0.446*** 
 (0.0332) (0.122)  (0.0307)  (0.0598)  (0.228) (0.193)  (0.157) (0.165) 
Constant -0.274 -0.401  -0.596**  -0.0576  0.489 0.133  0.0742 -0.774 
 (0.324) (0.433)  (0.289)  (0.241)  (0.682) (0.729)  (0.599) (0.611) 
             
Lambda -0.0774 0.00590  0.0422  -0.0904  -0.126 -0.0304  -0.137*** -0.0566 
 (0.152) (0.145)  (0.0938)  (0.116)  (0.0975) (0.0405)  (0.0516) (0.0433) 
             
Observations 2,697 2,697  6,131  6,131  2,697 2,697  6,131 6,131 
Uncensored Obs. 2421 276  4289  1842  2421 276  4289 1842 
F-Test 78.75 79.55  126.06  125.72  39.80 30.55  47.02 46.56 
rho -0.135 0.010  0.066  -0.131  -0.495 0.669  -0.386 0.561 
sigma 0.574 0.577  0.636  0.691  0.586 1.428  1.285 1.970 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes:1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
           2) Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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TABLE 4: Semi-Parametric Least Squares (SLS) Estimates of Employment Sector Choice by 
Gender, Egypt 1998-2012 
 Female  
Wage Earner 
 Male  
Wage Earner 
 (SLS) (SLS)  (SLS) (SLS) 
VARIABLES Public Private  Public Private 
      
Other_ public 0.113 0.192***  0.0959*** -1.320*** 
 (0.0913) (0.0263)  (0.0176) (0.196) 
Other_ private -0.414*** -0.0124***  0.0116*** 0.115*** 
 (0.0919) (0.00311)  (0.00183) (0.0156) 
Age  0.0235 0.00708  0.0217*** 0.181*** 
 (0.0297) (0.00868)  (0.00432) (0.0387) 
Age Squared -0.000156 -0.000258**  -0.000131*** -0.000856* 
 (0.0394) (0.0115)  (0.00449) (0.0442) 
Married  1.338*** -0.143***  -0.0226* -0.187 
 (0.0837) (0.0279)  (0.0122) (0.123) 
Children  -0.0164 -0.0862***  0.0642*** 0.646*** 
 (0.0943) (0.0235)  (0.0120) (0.112) 
      
Observations 2,699 2,699  6,134 6,134 
Root MSE 0.277 0.266  0.408 0.408 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes:1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
           2) We also included the sector of work, regions and year dummies. But, the estimates did not convergence 
in this case. Therefore, they are excluded. 
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TABLE 5: Mincer Earnings Equations with Sample Selection Correction, Quantile Regression, Female Sample, Egypt, 1998-2012 
 Public  Private 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90  q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Age  0.0515*** 0.0554*** 0.0470*** 0.0399*** 0.0150  0.0515*** 0.0561*** 0.0484*** 0.0422*** 0.0202 
 (0.0128) (0.0118) (0.0089) (0.0098) (0.0178)  (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0085) (0.0108) (0.0191) 
Age Squared  -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.0002* -0.0001 0.0001  -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.0002** -0.0002 0.0001 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Year of Schooling 0.0807*** 0.0807*** 0.0714*** 0.0674*** 0.0630***  0.0804*** 0.0820*** 0.0711*** 0.0671*** 0.0643*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0041) (0.0052) (0.0101)  (0.0056) (0.0063) (0.0041) (0.0051) (0.0110) 
Household size 0.0111 0.0014 0.0041 -0.0051 -0.0160  0.0115 0.0036 0.0057 -0.0076 -0.0163 
 (0.0103) (0.0084) (0.0057) (0.0100) (0.0124)  (0.0103) (0.0080) (0.0061) (0.0105) (0.0130) 
Sector            
Construction -0.7165 0.2764 0.3886 0.3592 0.7679*  -0.5698 0.2476 0.3495 0.3135 0.7340* 
 (0.6244) (0.4351) (0.4301) (0.4200) (0.4124)  (0.5818) (0.4648) (0.3788) (0.5177) (0.4349) 
Trade -0.3199 -0.1751 -0.0006 -0.1009 -0.2753  -0.3053 -0.2296 -0.0390 -0.1420 -0.2912 
 (0.1949) (0.1933) (0.1234) (0.1294) (0.1692)  (0.2349) (0.1820) (0.1189) (0.1415) (0.1826) 
Transportation -0.4541 -0.0655 -0.0999 -0.1776 -0.1785  -0.3235 -0.0274 -0.0699 -0.1465 -0.2051 
 (0.3087) (0.1194) (0.1021) (0.1657) (0.2890)  (0.3237) (0.1102) (0.0908) (0.1629) (0.2582) 
Finance & Services -0.3312*** -0.2232*** -0.2088*** -0.3051*** -0.2711**  -0.1968** -0.2014*** -0.1518** -0.2776*** -0.2852** 
 (0.1133) (0.0725) (0.0707) (0.0530) (0.1276)  (0.0952) (0.0780) (0.0654) (0.0621) (0.1229) 
Region            
Alexandria, Sz C. -0.0904 -0.1059** -0.1255*** -0.1032** -0.2368***  -0.0546 -0.0866* -0.1213*** -0.1142** -0.2333*** 
 (0.0627) (0.0429) (0.0314) (0.0472) (0.0786)  (0.0637) (0.0463) (0.0394) (0.0554) (0.0864) 
Urban Lower -0.1195* -0.1265*** -0.1690*** -0.1950*** -0.3461***  -0.0828 -0.1027** -0.1600*** -0.1928*** -0.3312*** 
 (0.0636) (0.0392) (0.0352) (0.0493) (0.0870)  (0.0657) (0.0455) (0.0377) (0.0447) (0.0941) 
Urban Upper -0.1141* -0.1339*** -0.1384*** -0.1261** -0.2334***  -0.0788 -0.1219** -0.1311*** -0.1253** -0.2293*** 
 (0.0627) (0.0400) (0.0325) (0.0538) (0.0760)  (0.0647) (0.0485) (0.0399) (0.0524) (0.0847) 
Rural Lower -0.1337* -0.1397*** -0.1776*** -0.1886*** -0.3116***  -0.0953 -0.1054** -0.1641*** -0.1930*** -0.3167*** 
 (0.0703) (0.0514) (0.0364) (0.0526) (0.0812)  (0.0723) (0.0527) (0.0401) (0.0500) (0.0900) 
Rural Upper -0.3011** -0.2124*** -0.1462*** -0.1646** -0.1262  -0.2667** -0.1908** -0.1248** -0.1578** -0.1180 
 (0.1370) (0.0739) (0.0514) (0.0730) (0.1775)  (0.1227) (0.0753) (0.0513) (0.0752) (0.1611) 
Year            
2006 0.1989*** 0.1981*** 0.1505*** 0.1476*** 0.2302***  0.2047*** 0.2023*** 0.1415*** 0.1491*** 0.2239*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0320) (0.0306) (0.0315) (0.0522)  (0.0476) (0.0373) (0.0337) (0.0319) (0.0569) 
2012 0.0467 0.2015*** 0.2833*** 0.3021*** 0.3404***  0.0561 0.1822*** 0.2796*** 0.2951*** 0.3391*** 
 (0.0520) (0.0426) (0.0354) (0.0341) (0.0489)  (0.0513) (0.0489) (0.0334) (0.0353) (0.0508) 
Constant -1.6052*** -1.3684*** -0.7519*** -0.1565 0.8328**  -1.7939*** -1.4898*** -0.8763*** -0.2088 0.7055** 
 (0.3082) (0.2461) (0.1683) (0.2074) (0.3496)  (0.2716) (0.2208) (0.1732) (0.2275) (0.3583) 
            
Lambda 0.1714* 0.1636*** 0.1551 0.0686 0.0510  0.0082 0.0367 0.0236 -0.0052 0.0118 
 (0.1000) (0.0595) (0.4680) (0.0513) (0.0944)  (0.0410) (0.0270) (0.0228) (0.0267) (0.0446) 
            
Observations 2,697 2,697 2,697 2,697 2,697  2,697 2,697 2,697 2,697 2,697 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
            2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis, 100 replications.
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TABLE 6: Mincer Earnings Equations with Sample Selection Correction, Quantile Regression, Male Sample, Egypt, 1998-2012 
 Public  Private 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90  q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
            
Age  0.0367*** 0.0275*** 0.0262*** 0.0154** 0.0322**  0.0357*** 0.0274*** 0.0266*** 0.0169** 0.0314** 
 (0.0092) (0.0077) (0.0064) (0.0073) (0.0135)  (0.0085) (0.0066) (0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0127) 
Age Squared  -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002  -0.0002 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)  (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Year of Schooling 0.0639*** 0.0616*** 0.0588*** 0.0563*** 0.0592***  0.0640*** 0.0618*** 0.0587*** 0.0570*** 0.0599*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0036)  (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0045) 
Household size -0.0062 0.0002 0.0026 -0.0012 0.0018  -0.0061 0.0007 0.0033 -0.0012 0.0022 
 (0.0070) (0.0054) (0.0031) (0.0042) (0.0080)  (0.0066) (0.0057) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0090) 
Sector            
Construction 0.1260 0.1213** 0.1997*** 0.2291*** 0.3298*  0.1257 0.1182** 0.2031*** 0.2373*** 0.3420** 
 (0.0776) (0.0577) (0.0662) (0.0549) (0.1748)  (0.1006) (0.0538) (0.0722) (0.0678) (0.1652) 
Trade -0.2491*** -0.2262*** -0.1564*** -0.1280** -0.1534*  -0.2439*** -0.2310*** -0.1536*** -0.1323** -0.1433* 
 (0.0660) (0.0547) (0.0462) (0.0536) (0.0850)  (0.0642) (0.0553) (0.0496) (0.0533) (0.0808) 
Transportation 0.0161 0.1032*** 0.1270*** 0.1712*** 0.1497**  0.0123 0.1061*** 0.1306*** 0.1806*** 0.1552** 
 (0.0499) (0.0349) (0.0321) (0.0388) (0.0655)  (0.0574) (0.0367) (0.0318) (0.0415) (0.0736) 
Finance & Services -0.1797*** -0.0687* -0.0765*** -0.0414 -0.0745  -0.1872*** -0.0705** -0.0723*** -0.0408 -0.0703 
 (0.0526) (0.0376) (0.0282) (0.0335) (0.0517)  (0.0465) (0.0346) (0.0267) (0.0323) (0.0602) 
Region            
Alexandria, Sz C. -0.0008 -0.0290 -0.0383 -0.0430 -0.1072  -0.0023 -0.0272 -0.0384 -0.0332 -0.1107 
 (0.0470) (0.0422) (0.0318) (0.0346) (0.0742)  (0.0358) (0.0343) (0.0346) (0.0410) (0.0713) 
Urban Lower -0.0694* -0.1255*** -0.1687*** -0.2015*** -0.2335***  -0.0729** -0.1297*** -0.1703*** -0.2047*** -0.2330*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0321) (0.0291) (0.0337) (0.0728)  (0.0333) (0.0328) (0.0255) (0.0383) (0.0738) 
Urban Upper -0.0946** -0.0730** -0.1038*** -0.1378*** -0.2371***  -0.0934* -0.0762** -0.1084*** -0.1307*** -0.2361*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0320) (0.0228) (0.0330) (0.0662)  (0.0509) (0.0358) (0.0263) (0.0359) (0.0691) 
Rural Lower -0.1575*** -0.2127*** -0.2313*** -0.2912*** -0.4146***  -0.1589*** -0.2139*** -0.2356*** -0.2900*** -0.4163*** 
 (0.0387) (0.0310) (0.0274) (0.0344) (0.0642)  (0.0383) (0.0290) (0.0235) (0.0369) (0.0622) 
Rural Upper -0.1398*** -0.1697*** -0.1619*** -0.1898*** -0.2027**  -0.1371*** -0.1727*** -0.1671*** -0.1880*** -0.1978** 
 (0.0434) (0.0378) (0.0276) (0.0348) (0.0892)  (0.0428) (0.0359) (0.0284) (0.0392) (0.0976) 
Year            
2006 0.2248*** 0.2357*** 0.2299*** 0.1979*** 0.3424***  0.2241*** 0.2343*** 0.2322*** 0.1958*** 0.3445*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0251) (0.0164) (0.0229) (0.0524)  (0.0289) (0.0244) (0.0173) (0.0265) (0.0526) 
2012 0.1780*** 0.2701*** 0.3146*** 0.3443*** 0.3861***  0.1770*** 0.2689*** 0.3165*** 0.3456*** 0.3875*** 
 (0.0328) (0.0247) (0.0187) (0.0228) (0.0431)  (0.0306) (0.0266) (0.0180) (0.0285) (0.0437) 
Constant -0.9469*** -0.5739*** -0.2275* 0.4120*** 0.5252*  -0.9418*** -0.6004*** -0.2778* 0.3124* 0.4705* 
 (0.2015) (0.1665) (0.1288) (0.1499) (0.2783)  (0.1936) (0.1462) (0.1481) (0.1606) (0.2815) 
            
Lambda -0.0486 -0.0795 -0.0947* -0.1318 -0.1399***  -0.0559 -0.1071 -0.1345*** -0.1866* -0.1957*** 
 (0.0330) (0.2192) (0.0505) (0.2091) (0.0330)  (0.0466) (0.3101) (0.0279) (0.1354) (0.0588) 
            
Observations 6,131 6,131 6,131 6,131 6,131  6,131 6,131 6,131 6,131 6,131 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
            2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis, 100 replications. 
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TABLE 7: Decomposition of Public-Private Wage Differentials by Gender and Male-Female 
Wage Differentials by Sector of Work, Egypt, 1998-2012 
 
Mean Log Wage Differential 
Between Public and Private 
Sector Workers  
Mean Log Wage Differential 
Between  Male and Female 
Workers 
Wage Differential Female 
 
Male Public 
 
Private 
Total mean differential 0.249 
 
-0.003 
 
0.017 
 
0.270 
Component attributable to:        
Constant  0.127 
 
-0.538 
 
-0.102 
 
0.035 
Endowments  0.048 
 
0.169 
 
-0.028 
 
-0.031 
Coefficient  0.092 
 
0.297 
 
0.234 
 
0.197 
Selection  -0.014 
 
0.123 
 
0.086 
 
-0.256 
Total unexplained differential 0.220 
 
-0. 240 
 
0. 132 
 
0. 233 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
 
37 
 
 
TABLE 8: Summary of Estimation Results: Public-Private Sector Wage Gap by Gender, Egypt, 1998-2012 
Male 
  mean 
   q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Estimation Method           
RAW WAGE GAP      
     
Public Wage Gap  -0.00341    -0.0726*** -0.0421* 0.0244 0.0540** 0.0295 
  (0.0208)    (0.0279) (0.0253) (0.0182) (0.0225) (0.0514) 
OLS and QR           
Public Wage Gap  -0.136***    -0.0582 -0.1057*** -0.1362*** -0.1934*** -0.1932*** 
  (0.0262)    (0.0455) (0.0273) (0.0303) (0.0329) (0.0536) 
FE and FEQR           
Public Wage Gap  -0.278***    -0.2639*** -0.2976*** -0.2779*** -0.2192*** -0.2707*** 
  (0.0953)    (0.0349) (0.0157) (0.0000) (0.0192) (0.0296) 
Female 
  mean 
   q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Estimation Method           
RAW WAGE GAP           
Public Wage Gap  0.250***    0.3763*** 0.3653*** 0.2877*** 0.1316** 0.1643** 
  (0.0473)    (0.0836) (0.0596) (0.0586) (0.0623) (0.0719) 
OLS and QR           
Public Wage Gap  0.109**    0.1822* 0.1539*** 0.1352*** 0.0727 0.0496 
  (0.0493)    (0.1019) (0.0518) (0.0501) (0.0521) (0.0903) 
FE            
Public Wage Gap  -0.135    - - - - - 
  (0.134)         
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
            2) OLS indicates ordinary least squares estimates. QR indicates quantile regression estimates. FE is fixed effect estimates. FEQR is the fixed effect quantile regression 
estimates. OLS and FE standard errors are robust and QR and FEQR standard errors are computed by bootstrap method 100 replications.    
           3) Regression coefficients on the table are based on the regressions reported in Appendix A, Tables A2-A5. 
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TABLE 9: Public Sector Wage Gap by Education Levels,  Male Sample, Egypt, 1998-2012  
  
Less than  
Primary  
Less than  
Intermediate  
Intermediate  
and Above  
University  
and Above 
Male FE -0.148  0.0769  -0.306**  -0.434** 
  (0.239)  (0.225)  (0.15)  (0.179) 
FEQR q10 -0.1208 0.0102  -0.3107*** -0.2681*** 
  (0.0788)  (0.0522)  (0.0475)  (0.0774) 
 q25 -0.1482*** 0.0540*** -0.3122*** -0.4151*** 
  (0.0167)  (0.0156)  (0.0185)  (0.0314) 
 q50 -0.1482*** 0.0656*** -0.3058*** -0.3972*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
 q75 -0.1482*** 0.0795*** -0.2648*** -0.3705*** 
  (0.0192)  (0.0197)  (0.0273)  (0.0268) 
 q90 -0.1970** 0.1421**  -0.2645*** -0.4506*** 
  (0.0985)  (0.0631)  (0.0622)  (0.0646) 
 Observations 834  758  2610  1929 
Source: Authors computations using ELMPS 2008, 2006 and 2012.  
Notes: 1) ***, **and * indicate significance at 1, 5and 10 percent levels.  
2) Each of the regressions includes a constant, Age, Age Squared, Years of Schooling, Dummies for marital status, having children, household size, and dummies for 
time and dummies for regions. These are not reported for brevity. 
3) FE standard errors are robust and FEQR standard errors are computed by bootstrap method 100 replications. 
 
TABLE 10: Summary Results by the Subsamples of Two Time Periods, Age and Education, Male Sample, Egypt, 1998-2012 
Subsamples mean q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
(1998-2006)       
Public Wage Gap -0.508 -0.4904*** -0.4892*** -0.4892*** -0.4892*** -0.4782*** 
 (0.421) (0.0167) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0197) 
Observations 2777 2777 2777 2777 2777 2777 
(2006-2012)       
Public Wage Gap -0.204* -0.204* -0.2131*** -0.2185*** -0.2037*** -0.1903*** 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.0349) (0.0073) (0.000) (0.0076) 
Observations 3793 3793 3793 3793 3793 3793 
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Age<Mean Age       
Public Wage Gap -0.352** -0.3384*** -0.3517*** -0.3517*** -0.3312*** -0.3288*** 
 (0.144) (0.0361) (0.0076) (0.000) (0.0131) (0.036) 
Observations 3072 3072 3072 3072 3072 3072 
Age>Mean Age       
Public Wage Gap -0.216 -0.1571*** -0.2142*** -0.2158*** -0.2164*** -0.2378*** 
 (0.190) (0.0505) (0.0122) (0.000) (0.0113) (0.0518) 
Observations 3059 3059 3059 3059 3059 3059 
Years of Sch< Mean Years of Sch       
Public Wage Gap -0.179 -0.2000*** -0.1926*** -0.1786*** -0.1375*** -0.1794*** 
 (0.130) (0.0425) (0.0115) (0.000) (0.0297) (0.0456) 
Observations 2083 2083 2083 2083 2083 2083 
Years of Sch> Mean Years of Sch       
Public Wage Gap -0.352*** -0.2909*** -0.3566*** -0.3516*** -0.3168*** -0.3665*** 
 (0.129) (0.0395) (0.0245) (0.000) (0.021) (0.0476) 
Observations 4048 4048 4048 4048 4048 4048 
Source: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
2) Mean indicates fixed effect (FE) estimates. FEQR is fixed effect quantile regression estimates. 
3) The Mean Age for the male sample is 39.93. The mean years of schooling for the male sample is 11.61. 
4) The standard errors for FE estimates are robust and those for FEQR are computed by bootstrap method, 100 replications. 
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TABLE 11:  Average Log Hourly Wage by Gender and Region, Egypt, 1998-2012 
 Egypt Gr. Cairo Alx, Sz C. Urb. Lwr.    Urb. Upp. Rur. Lwr. Rur. Upp. 
Pooled Data        
All 1.577 1.783 1.677 1.568 1.594 1.428 1.453 
Male 1.591 1.790 1.720 1.601 1.629 1.435 1.474 
Female 1.547 1.769 1.599 1.511 1.531 1.407 1.328 
1998        
All 1.344 1.603 1.412 1.310 1.353 1.128 1.094 
Male 1.340 1.571 1.481 1.307 1.375 1.144 1.088 
Female 1.353 1.662 1.294 1.315 1.316 1.074 1.139 
2006        
All 1.612 1.839 1.732 1.622 1.656 1.411 1.458 
Male 1.630 1.864 1.791 1.658 1.692 1.420 1.493 
Female 1.571 1.789 1.622 1.560 1.594 1.382 1.191 
2012        
All 1.674 1.850 1.797 1.697 1.697 1.551 1.574 
Male 1.691 1.858 1.801 1.758 1.739 1.558 1.601 
Female 1.638 1.832 1.789 1.598 1.619 1.532 1.454 
Source: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012.  
Notes: Log hourly wage is in Egyptian Pounds real 2012 prices deflated using consumer price index. 
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TABLE 12: Public Sector Wage Gap by Region, Male Sample, Egypt, 1998-2012  
 
 
Greater  
Cairo 
 
Alexandria, 
 Sz. C 
 
Urban  
Lower 
 
Urban  
Upper 
 
Rural  
Lower 
 
Rural  
Upper 
Male FE -0.23 
 
-0.274 
 
-0.468* 
 
-0.245* 
 
-0.433*** 
 
0.0522 
 
 
(0.215) 
 
(0.392) 
 
(0.27) 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.137) 
 
(0.257) 
FEQR q10 -0.1172* 
 
-0.2309*** -0.4103*** -0.1655* 
 
-0.3792*** 0.059 
 
 
(0.0698) 
 
(0.0594) 
 
(0.086) 
 
(0.0949) 
 
(0.0521) 
 
80.0929) 
 q25 -0.2402*** -0.3003*** -0.5293*** -0.2620*** -0.4546*** 0.0348 
 
 
(0.0267) 
 
(0.0428) 
 
(0.0419) 
 
(0.0302) 
 
(0.0281) 
 
(0.0244) 
 q50 -0.2301*** -0.2739*** -0.4683*** -0.2453*** -0.4332*** 0.0522*** 
 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 q75 -0.2231*** -0.1903*** -0.4007*** -0.1586*** -0.4077*** 0.0565** 
 
 
(0.0295) 
 
(0.0397) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.0314) 
 
(0.0262) 
 
(0.0242) 
 q90 -0.2260*** -0.2345*** -0.4787*** -0.2088** 
 
-0.4677*** 0.1315 
 
 
(0.0729) 
 
(0.0608) 
 
(0.1269) 
 
(0.087) 
 
(0.0612) 
 
(0.0899) 
Observations  1026  670  809  1201  1531  894 
Source: Authors computations using ELMPS 2008, 2006 and 2012.  
Notes: 1) ***, **and * indicate significance at 1, 5and 10 percent levels.  
2) Each of the regressions includes a constant, age, age squared, years of schooling, dummies for marital 
status, having children, household size and dummies for time. These are not reported for brevity. 
3) The standard errors for FE are robust and those of FEQR are computed by bootstrap method, 100 
replications. 
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APPENDIX-A 
 
TABLE A1: Mincer Earnings Equations, OLS and Fixed Effects, Egypt, 1998-2012 
 (OLS) (OLS) (FE) (FE) 
VARIABLES Male Female Male Female 
Public wage gap -0.136*** 0.109** -0.278*** -0.135 
 (0.0262) (0.0493) (0.0953) (0.134) 
Age 0.0262*** 0.0324*** 0.0498*** 0.0449** 
 (0.00744) (0.00873) (0.0177) (0.0205) 
Age Squared -0.0000611 -0.0000476 -0.000413** -0.000612*** 
 (0.00895) (0.0110) (0.0163) (0.0198) 
Year of Schooling 0.0604*** 0.0682*** 0.00259 0.0315* 
 (0.00208) (0.00446) (0.0119) (0.0186) 
Married 0.0928*** 0.0863*** 0.121** 0.0151 
 (0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0592) (0.0635) 
Children -0.0687*** -0.0188 -0.0142 -0.0459 
 (0.0226) (0.0293) (0.0406) (0.0496) 
Household size 0.00466 -0.00606 0.0129* 0.00208 
 (0.00429) (0.00735) (0.00724) (0.0141) 
Sector     
Construction 0.168*** 0.291 -0.0966 0.0341 
 (0.0590) (0.288) (0.182) (0.567) 
Trade -0.199*** -0.179* -0.00424 -0.182 
 (0.0454) (0.102) (0.121) (0.205) 
Transportation 0.103*** -0.102 0.0348 0.00686 
 (0.0342) (0.112) (0.110) (0.254) 
Finance & Services -0.0835*** -0.231*** -0.104 -0.170 
 (0.0290) (0.0594) (0.0816) (0.165) 
Region     
Alexandria, Sz C. -0.0538 -0.114*** 0.523** 0.134 
 (0.0340) (0.0382) (0.255) (0.347) 
Urban Lower -0.150*** -0.202*** 0.583** -0.321 
 (0.0319) (0.0354) (0.253) (0.266) 
Urban Upper -0.123*** -0.165*** 0.0370 -0.291 
 (0.0300) (0.0354) (0.269) (0.248) 
Rural Lower -0.259*** -0.200*** 0.675** -0.232 
 (0.0286) (0.0382) (0.278) (0.309) 
Rural Upper -0.168*** -0.197*** -0.0616 -0.0209 
 (0.0337) (0.0710) (0.124) (0.183) 
Year     
2006 0.274*** 0.198*** 0.389*** 0.496*** 
 (0.0206) (0.0268) (0.0751) (0.121) 
2012 0.286*** 0.225*** 0.510*** 0.742*** 
 (0.0215) (0.0294) (0.138) (0.228) 
Constant -0.0432 -0.490*** -0.270 0.321 
 (0.141) (0.170) (0.464) (0.666) 
     
Observations 6,131 2,697 6,131 2,697 
R-squared 0.241 0.310 0.236 0.287 
F test (Prob>F ) 0.00 0.00   
Number of id   3,777 1,536 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 2)  For OLS and FE robust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
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TABLE A2: Mincer Earnings Equations, Quantile Regression, Male Sample, Egypt, 1998-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Public wage gap -0.0582 -0.1057*** -0.1362*** -0.1934*** -0.1932*** 
 (0.0455) (0.0273) (0.0303) (0.0329) (0.0536) 
Age 0.0222** 0.0180** 0.0234*** 0.0117 0.0375** 
 (0.0112) (0.0071) (0.0077) (0.0080) (0.0157) 
Age Squared -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Year of Schooling 0.0638*** 0.0620*** 0.0596*** 0.0579*** 0.0591*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0040) 
Married 0.1593*** 0.1585*** 0.1074*** 0.0716** 0.0093 
 (0.0437) (0.0258) (0.0271) (0.0325) (0.0684) 
Children -0.0607* -0.0760*** -0.0420* -0.0332 -0.0495 
 (0.0322) (0.0200) (0.0218) (0.0259) (0.0482) 
Household size 0.0009 0.0083 0.0075** 0.0017 0.0065 
 (0.0067) (0.0058) (0.0032) (0.0047) (0.0104) 
Sector      
Construction 0.1268* 0.1434** 0.2182*** 0.2314*** 0.3295** 
 (0.0752) (0.0563) (0.0773) (0.0600) (0.1677) 
Trade -0.2498*** -0.2280*** -0.1794*** -0.1479*** -0.1344 
 (0.0729) (0.0547) (0.0473) (0.0494) (0.0834) 
Transportation -0.0154 0.1000*** 0.1098*** 0.1873*** 0.1605** 
 (0.0452) (0.0307) (0.0309) (0.0363) (0.0716) 
Finance & 
Services 
-0.1980*** -0.0820*** -0.0852*** -0.0378 -0.0659 
 (0.0457) (0.0291) (0.0256) (0.0318) (0.0606) 
Region      
Alexandria, Sz 
C. 
-0.0073 -0.0260 -0.0471 -0.0316 -0.0957 
 (0.0475) (0.0342) (0.0322) (0.0389) (0.0654) 
Urban Lower -0.0602 -0.1381*** -0.1644*** -0.1987*** -0.2145*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0372) (0.0313) (0.0366) (0.0785) 
Urban Upper -0.0842 -0.0737** -0.1117*** -0.1415*** -0.2199*** 
 (0.0554) (0.0319) (0.0293) (0.0366) (0.0743) 
Rural Lower -0.1537*** -0.2193*** -0.2344*** -0.2879*** -0.3928*** 
 (0.0372) (0.0297) (0.0280) (0.0353) (0.0656) 
Rural Upper -0.1448*** -0.1885*** -0.1713*** -0.1932*** -0.1943** 
 (0.0507) (0.0323) (0.0310) (0.0402) (0.0895) 
Year      
2006 0.2029*** 0.2254*** 0.2270*** 0.1881*** 0.3260*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0219) (0.0174) (0.0210) (0.0561) 
2012 0.1538*** 0.2443*** 0.3045*** 0.3351*** 0.3644*** 
 (0.0353) (0.0235) (0.0201) (0.0224) (0.0434) 
Constant -0.6753*** -0.3626** -0.1304 0.5651*** 0.5491* 
 (0.2125) (0.1409) (0.1468) (0.1538) (0.2891) 
Observations 6,131 6,131 6,131 6,131 6,131 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
            2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis (100 replications). 
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TABLE A3: Mincer Earnings Equations, Quantile Regression, Female Sample, Egypt, 1998-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Public wage gap 0.1822* 0.1539*** 0.1352*** 0.0727 0.0496 
 (0.1019) (0.0518) (0.0501) (0.0521) (0.0903) 
Age 0.0400*** 0.0505*** 0.0410*** 0.0362*** 0.0212 
 (0.0130) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0092) (0.0176) 
Age Squared -0.0000 -0.0002* -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 
 (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Year of Schooling 0.0791*** 0.0776*** 0.0706*** 0.0635*** 0.0634*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0064) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0105) 
Married 0.0864 0.1096*** 0.0747*** 0.0920*** 0.0366 
 (0.0637) (0.0338) (0.0286) (0.0323) (0.0525) 
Children 0.0122 -0.0217 0.0096 -0.0059 -0.0649 
 (0.0499) (0.0349) (0.0323) (0.0401) (0.0641) 
Household size 0.0093 -0.0038 0.0019 -0.0091 -0.0071 
      
Sector (0.0121) (0.0086) (0.0056) (0.0095) (0.0150) 
Construction -0.7436 0.1919 0.3860 0.3244 0.6942 
 (0.6173) (0.4294) (0.3111) (0.4715) (0.4379) 
Trade -0.2661 -0.1563 -0.0418 -0.0820 -0.3074* 
 (0.2059) (0.2045) (0.1023) (0.1365) (0.1611) 
Transportation -0.4127 -0.1290 -0.1184 -0.1692 -0.2037 
 (0.2901) (0.1204) (0.1124) (0.1403) (0.2703) 
Finance & 
Services 
-0.3445*** -0.2639*** -0.2216*** -0.2901*** -0.3078** 
 (0.1005) (0.0791) (0.0643) (0.0560) (0.1240) 
Region      
Alexandria, Sz 
C. 
-0.0879 -0.1386** -0.1300*** -0.1214** -0.2310*** 
 (0.0590) (0.0540) (0.0415) (0.0549) (0.0840) 
Urban Lower -0.1317** -0.1562*** -0.1829*** -0.2379*** -0.3487*** 
 (0.0611) (0.0385) (0.0377) (0.0450) (0.0783) 
Urban Upper -0.1218** -0.1482*** -0.1381*** -0.1414*** -0.2341*** 
 (0.0561) (0.0400) (0.0333) (0.0497) (0.0779) 
Rural Lower -0.1176* -0.1431*** -0.2011*** -0.2446*** -0.2958*** 
 (0.0632) (0.0439) (0.0336) (0.0458) (0.0789) 
Rural Upper -0.3313*** -0.2506*** -0.1744*** -0.2133*** -0.1309 
 (0.1200) (0.0659) (0.0498) (0.0778) (0.1695) 
Year      
2006 0.1967*** 0.2195*** 0.1434*** 0.1596*** 0.2404*** 
 (0.0438) (0.0342) (0.0293) (0.0343) (0.0518) 
2012 0.0396 0.2115*** 0.2964*** 0.3218*** 0.3357*** 
 (0.0475) (0.0396) (0.0340) (0.0403) (0.0461) 
Constant -1.5865*** -1.3842*** -0.7781*** -0.1238 0.6717** 
 (0.2947) (0.2154) (0.1968) (0.1796) (0.3400) 
      
Observations 2,697 2,697 2,697 2,697 2,697 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
           2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis, 100 replications. 
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TABLE A4: Mincer Earnings Equations, Fixed Effect Quantile Regression, Male Sample, Egypt, 1998-
2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
Public wage gap -0.2639*** -0.2976*** -0.2779*** -0.2192*** -0.2707*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0157) (0.0000) (0.0192) (0.0296) 
Age 0.0108 0.0351*** 0.0498*** 0.0570*** 0.0796*** 
 (0.0079) (0.0034) (0.0000) (0.0026) (0.0084) 
Age Squared 0.0000 -0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0007*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Year of Schooling 0.0022 0.0009 0.0026*** 0.0041*** 0.0061** 
 (0.0025) (0.0008) (0.0000) (0.0009) (0.0028) 
Married 0.1452*** 0.1387*** 0.1214*** 0.1222*** 0.1000*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0092) (0.0000) (0.0073) (0.0388) 
Children -0.0694** -0.0505*** -0.0142*** 0.0210* 0.0223 
 (0.0283) (0.0112) (0.0000) (0.0115) (0.0285) 
Household size 0.0136** 0.0150*** 0.0129*** 0.0126*** 0.0119** 
 (0.0055) (0.0023) (0.0000) (0.0024) (0.0052) 
Sector      
Construction -0.0024 -0.0836*** -0.0966*** -0.1028*** -0.1941*** 
 (0.0413) (0.0101) (0.0000) (0.0096) (0.0540) 
Trade 0.0516 0.0025 -0.0042*** -0.0041 -0.0385 
 (0.0668) (0.0093) (0.0000) (0.0077) (0.0444) 
Transportation 0.0156 0.0270*** 0.0348*** 0.0397*** 0.0560 
 (0.0403) (0.0091) (0.0000) (0.0088) (0.0431) 
Finance & 
Services 
-0.1680*** -0.1504*** -0.1037*** -0.0721*** -0.0504 
 (0.0369) (0.0182) (0.0000) (0.0184) (0.0378) 
Region      
Alexandria, Sz 
C. 
0.5772*** 0.5177*** 0.5232*** 0.5447*** 0.4979*** 
 (0.0449) (0.0140) (0.0000) (0.0169) (0.0425) 
Urban Lower 0.6802*** 0.5880*** 0.5825*** 0.5799*** 0.4913*** 
 (0.0396) (0.0126) (0.0000) (0.0105) (0.0400) 
Urban Upper 0.1036*** 0.0470*** 0.0370*** 0.0207* 0.0120 
 (0.0395) (0.0160) (0.0000) (0.0108) (0.0431) 
Rural Lower 0.7921*** 0.6763*** 0.6754*** 0.6801*** 0.5797*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0112) (0.0000) (0.0090) (0.0378) 
Rural Upper 0.0096 -0.0465*** -0.0616*** -0.0702*** -0.1167** 
 (0.0451) (0.0140) (0.0000) (0.0110) (0.0467) 
Year      
2006 0.3621*** 0.3529*** 0.3889*** 0.3618*** 0.3571*** 
 (0.0269) (0.0125) (0.0000) (0.0174) (0.0297) 
2012 0.5190*** 0.5227*** 0.5096*** 0.4847*** 0.4469*** 
 (0.0323) (0.0128) (0.0000) (0.0166) (0.0338) 
Constant 0.1946 -0.0112 -0.2704*** -0.3927*** -0.5593*** 
 (0.1450) (0.0562) (0.0000) (0.0542) (0.1656) 
Observations 6,131 6,131 6,131 6,131 6,131 
Sources: Authors’ computations using ELMPS data, 1998, 2006, 2012. 
Notes: 1) ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  
           2) Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis, 100 replications. 
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APPENDIX-B 
Sample Selection Correction in Quantile Regression Model 
In this appendix we present the sample selection correction method in a quantile regression 
model. In the presentation below we use the same notation as Buchinski (1998; 2001) and 
Pianto and Pianto (2002) and summarize the discussion in these references. This method is a 
variant of the standard Heckman two-step procedure used to control for sample selectivity. It is 
similar to that previously suggested by Heckman (1979) and extended by Newey (1999) for the 
mean regression. It is introduced by Buchinsky (1998) and based on a nonparametric correction 
method. As usual there are two stages. In the first step, we use a simple probit model to estimate 
the probabilities of workers being in the public or private sector. However, we don't want to 
impose the restriction of normality. Therefore, a semi-parametric method which is developed 
by Ichimura (1993) is used. This makes no assumptions about the distribution of the residuals. 
We now summarize the steps involved. 
 First, a binary variable di and a latent or index variable g for public versus private sector 
selection are defined as follows: 
1: 0, sector
0 : 0, sector
i
i
i
g public
d
g private

 

 
The likelihood of a person i working in the public sector is given by the following equation 
where ix  is a set of personal characteristics: 
1i i ig x v  .                           (A1)                                                                                                  
 In the second step, we write a public wage offer equation as a quantile regression as follows:  
2
o
i i iy x u    
where 2x  is a subset of 1x  and 2 0( )i i iu x u     . 
To obtain an unbiased estimate of beta in the wage equation, an extra term must be introduced 
to the model. 
2 (g)y x h        
where 1( ) Quant ( | , 0)h g u x g    . This term includes information about the unobservable 
characteristics of public workers which affect their sector choice. 
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First Step Estimation: 
We obtain an estimate for the coefficient   in the equation (A1), by using the semi-parametric 
least squared (SLS) method. The estimator suggested by Ichimura (1993) is as follows: 
2
1 ,
1
1 ˆˆ arg min ( ( | ))
p
n
i i i
i
d E d x
n
 


     
Where 1
ˆ( | , )i iE d x  is a kernel density estimate of id  with kernel function (.)  and its 
bandwidth h and given by 
1 1
1
1 1
(( ) / )
ˆ ( | , )
(( ) / )
j i jj i
i i
i jj i
d x x h
E d x
x x h
  

  


 

 


  
The estimation of ˆ  is obtained here is the same as in Buchinsky (1998). This estimator 
asymptotically normal and asymptotic covariance matrix is given by 
1 1

     for ˆ . The 
estimation of  and  are calculated using the following equations: 
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ( )( ( | )( ( | )
n
i i i i i i i
i
f g x E x x x E x x
n
 

      ,  
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ( )( ( | , )) ( ( | )( ( | )
n
i i i i i i i i i i
i
f g d E d x x E x x x E x x
n
  

       .  
where ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) /f g dF g dg  and 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( | , ) ( | g)F g E d x E d    
Second Step Estimation: 
In the second step, we set up the quantile regression of y  on 2x  and ˆ( )sP g  to obtain a consistent 
estimator for  , that is, 
2
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ( ) { : 1}ii i i iy x Ps g i d          
or 
1
2
1
ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ))
S
j
i i i j i
j
y x g       


      
where the term ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( )h g Ps g    controls for the sample selection and ˆ( )Ps g is a polynomial 
of order S in gˆ . Without additional assumption we cannot always define  1 ˆ( ) 1S iP g   but we 
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need to define 1 ˆ( ) 1S iP g  to consistently estimates of the term in   corresponding to the 
constant (Buchinsky, 2001).  
The power series 1ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ) / ( )) jSjP g f g F g
   is used in this study for the estimation of the 
quantile regression in the second step, where (.)  and (.)  are the density and cumulative 
distribution function of a standard normal variable, respectively. (.) (.) / (.)    is inverse 
Mill’s ratio. ˆ (.)f  and ˆ (.)F  are the nonparametric estimates of the density and cumulative 
distribution function of i  respectively. The scaling parameters ˆ  and ˆ are needed for the 
normalization of ig  by ˆ ˆ ig  . We choose the scaling parameters as the constant and slope 
coefficients from a probit regression of id  on the index 1 ˆˆ( , )ig x  .  
